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[原创] 传染病暴发后隔离区域划分,但是距离如何限定呢?

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发表于 2013-1-29 13:28 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式

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传染病暴发后隔离区域划分,但是距离如何限定呢?
有人说100米,有人说500米,有人说1000米;
那么这个区域和范围究竟如何确定?有没有文献支持呢?

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 楼主| 发表于 2013-1-29 13:31 | 显示全部楼层
问过同行专家很多人也是意见不一致,我去查了国外文献,了解一下国外是如何评价和处理的。

皇天不负有心人,终于找到了。
还是SIFIC论坛宝藏多,原来早在2007年就有一位版主发表了这样的帖子。

原帖:挪威一起因空气除尘设施被污染而导致的军团病暴发
这个报道发表在注明杂志CID。

Clinical Infectious Diseases 2008;46:61–69

An Outbreak of Legionnaires Disease Caused by Long-Distance Spread from an Industrial Air Scrubber in Sarpsborg, Norway
挪威一起因空气除尘设施被污染而导致的军团病暴发
Karin Nygård,1  Øyvind Werner-Johansen,3 Svein Rønsen,4  Dominique A. Caugant,1  Øystein Simonsen,5.  Anita Kanestrøm,5  Eirik Ask,6  Jetmund Ringstad,5  Rune Ødegård,7  Tore Jensen,2  Truls Krogh,1  E. Arne Høiby,1  Eivind Ragnhildstveit,5  Ingeborg S. Aaberge,1 and Preben Aavitsland1

1Norwegian Institute of Public Health and 2Geodata, Oslo, 3Municipal Health Services, Sarpsborg, 4Municipal Health Services and 5Østfold Hospital Trust, Fredrikstad, 6Telelab, Skien, and 7Norwegian Institute for Air Research, Kjeller, Norway

Received 22 June 2007; accepted 24 August 2007; electronically published 30 November 2007.

Presented in part: 6th International Conference on Legionella, Chicago, Illinois, October 2005 (abstract 154).

Reprints or correspondence: Dr. Karin Nygård, Div. of Infectious Disease Control, Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Pb 4404 Nydalen, NO-0403 Oslo, Norway (karin.nygard@fhi.no).
Background.  On 21 May 2005, the Norwegian health authorities were alerted by officials from a local hospital that several recent patients had received the diagnosis of legionnaires disease; all patients resided in 2 neighboring municipalities. We investigated the outbreak to identify the source and to implement control measures.

Methods.  We interviewed all surviving case patients and investigated and harvested samples from 23 businesses with cooling towers and other potential infection sources. The locations of the businesses and the patients' residences and movements were mapped. We calculated attack rates and risk ratios among people living within various radii of each potential source. Isolates of Legionella pneumophila were compared using molecular methods.

Results.  Among 56 case patients, 10 died. The case patients became ill 12–25 May, resided up to 20 km apart, and had not visited places in common. Those living up to 1 km from a particular air scrubber had the highest risk ratio, and only for this source did the risk ratio decrease as the radius widened. Genetically identical L. pneumophila serogroup 1 isolates were recovered from patients and the air scrubber. The air scrubber is an industrial pollution-control device that cleans air for dust particles by spraying with water. The circulating water had a high organic content, pH of 8–9, and temperature of 40°C. The air was expelled at 20 m/s and contained a high amount of aerosolized water.

Conclusions.  The high velocity, large drift, and high humidity in the air scrubber may have contributed to the wide spread of Legionella species, probably for >10 km. The risk of Legionella spread from air scrubbers should be assessed.

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 楼主| 发表于 2013-1-29 13:32 | 显示全部楼层
为了战友没了解。我把英文全文,和论坛中文翻译稿都贴出来了。有兴趣可以下载。

挪威一起由空气洗涤器引发的军团菌病爆发.doc (46.5 KB, 下载次数: 7)

524016.web.pdf (602.49 KB, 下载次数: 2)
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 楼主| 发表于 2013-1-29 13:33 | 显示全部楼层
隔离区域限定:

假设居处地离污染源近的居民罹患率高,距离越远越低。围绕每个潜在的污染源划分了5个环形区域,1000米-10,000 米半径范围逐渐增加。按渐增的半径范围计算居民罹患率,每个潜在污染源按5个区域计算RR。此外,以居住在距污染源10km外居民为参照,与划定的各环形区域相比较,我们认为只有真正的污染源会随着距离增加发病风险减少。
大家还可以思考一下,算出来的5个RR值,怎么才能知道总体的RR值呢?
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发表于 2013-1-29 14:14 | 显示全部楼层
谢谢老师你的资料很好,下载学习了。
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发表于 2013-1-29 14:44 | 显示全部楼层
谢谢老师你的资料很好,下载学习了。
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发表于 2013-2-3 23:44 | 显示全部楼层

这么复杂的问题,恐怕曲高和寡,超版不如直接将公式和结果告知,如何?
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